The index mixes every department into one vector store
A semantically nearby quality file shows up as “helpful context” for a process question. The vaguer the question, the easier it is to step into a neighbor document.
A process engineer asks about a rework procedure. The knowledge-base agent answers thoroughly and includes an internal quality note the asker is not allowed to see. The file arrived as a “most relevant chunk.” RAG’s first gate is which documents may enter the candidate set. If that step only looks at similarity, the system prompt, refusal policy and output filter are all patching leaks. Yofune Labs puts knowledge-base permissions into a standardized AI agent security assessment. KUROSHIO is the validation engine that checks what retrieval hit, what the answer cited, and where that content went afterwards.
Permission has to happen at retrieval, not at the answer. If the model has already seen the full text, asking it to pretend it has not is unreliable. Being a logged-in employee is not the same as being allowed to see every chunk.
A semantically nearby quality file shows up as “helpful context” for a process question. The vaguer the question, the easier it is to step into a neighbor document.
Without caller identity and without department or tenant filters, the candidate set is the whole corpus. Application login only constrains who can open the chat window, not which chunks the retriever may fetch.
A confidentiality clause in the prompt is not a control. If the retrieval service account can see quality files, a process question can bring those files out.
If document IDs and permission labels used in the answer cannot be opened, an answer with no source cannot be production knowledge, and an overreach cannot be traced to a hit.
Leakage does not always look like a download. A normal Q&A turn that summarizes a paragraph the asker should not see is already data overreach. Chat logs, audit trails and feedback used to improve the model may store that summary again.
The retriever returns slices by similarity; one of them is an internal note the asker cannot access. The agent summarizes the slices together and never hits “permission denied,” because the call itself is only retrieval.
The dialogue layer is a directory account; the retrieval layer is a service identity that can read every document. Least privilege exists in the design doc; at runtime every question inherits the widest read scope.
Even without an export button, overreach is already in the answer, the session history and possibly evaluation feedback. Later spread matters as much as the original hit.
If a retrieval result is written into memory or a ticket summary, later questions from a different user may keep answering with that over-privileged fragment.
A penetration test sees break-in. RAG incidents are often the wrong door: the system accepts the retrieval, but the chunk should not have entered this identity’s candidates. The two reports do not measure the same thing.
RAG security testing looks at what retrieval hit, what the answer cited, and where that content went afterwards. Yofune Labs walks main paths with identity-bearing business questions rather than a single full-corpus scan. KUROSHIO records hits, citations and whether filtering applied.
Prepare at least two department or tenant identities and ask the same class of business question. See whether candidate chunks and the final answer leave that identity’s authorization.
Whether departments share a store, whether labels apply when chunks are fetched, whether the service account can see libraries outside the task. If you cannot filter, do not connect that corpus to the agent.
Vague questions jump to neighbor documents more easily. Questions that name a file confirm the filter is not limited to one phrasing.
Can the answer return to a document ID and a permission label? Did an over-privileged summary land in logs, memory or feedback? An answer with no source is not production knowledge.
With retrieval filters in place, the original question should not return over-privileged chunks. That path enters the regression set and runs before future index changes. KUROSHIO keeps the hit and intercept records.
The conclusion handed to the owner has to be concrete: login at the chat window is not authorization at the knowledge base. Leave retrieval unfixed, and the smarter the agent, the more complete the over-privileged summary.
Dialogue identity, retrieval identity, index or namespace, generator, logs and memory on one picture, showing where data enters and where it leaves.
Which department corpora share an index, whether retrieval filters by identity, the service account’s real read scope, and whether cross-permission hits raise an alert.
Which identity, which question, which class of chunk, what the answer cited, where it was stored afterwards. The path can be retold and regressed.
The question, retrieval candidates (redacted), citations, answer digest, whether filtering applied. Someone who did not attend the test should be able to check it — not only a spoken demo.
Retrieval requests carry caller identity and filter at fetch time; split stores or namespaces by tenant and department; prompt confidentiality becomes an aid, not a control. The same path is retested.
Which Q&A and knowledge base were in scope, whether the most important overreach is reproducible, and which retrieval controls must land before launch.
KUROSHIO is the validation engine that keeps hit, citation and intercept records. Identity at the chat window does not replace filtering at retrieval.
Switch between Scope, Explore, Validate and Report in an interactive workspace. See how authorized scope, task orchestration, linked evidence and a report summary fit together, using sample data to illustrate a general assessment workflow.
If the model has already seen the full text, asking it to pretend it has not is unreliable. Permission has to happen at retrieval: the request carries caller identity and chunks are filtered at fetch time. If you cannot filter, do not connect that corpus to the agent.
Yes. A normal Q&A turn that summarizes a paragraph the asker should not see is already overreach. Chat logs and feedback may store it again. The assessment looks at what was hit, what the answer cited, and where it went afterwards.
It needs corpora and identities that represent the permission boundary, not necessarily the full production store. Scope, residency and redaction are agreed before the assessment starts. Lab method explains the path; a controlled scenario is not written up as a customer win.
Yofune Labs’ standardized AI agent security assessment covers RAG security: knowledge-base permissions, department data overreach and citations you can open again. KUROSHIO is the validation engine that turns hits and answers into evidence. Start with the knowledge base you are connecting to an agent.